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CONSTITLABOUR LEICESTER09

THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF LABOUR RIGHTS1
Lecture at the School of Law, University of Leicester
24 November 2009

Harry Arthurs
York University
Toronto, Canada
I

THE LINK BETWEEN LABOUR RIGHTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

I will begin with an existential question: why am I here?

Why is someone with a

special interest in labour rights appearing in a speakers’ series devoted to human
rights?
Yes, it’s true: workers are human; they are not commodities; they are not factors of
production. People with an interest in human rights should therefore be as interested in
the oppression of workers as they in the oppression of people of colour or women or
disabled people. But labour rights and human rights are not easily collapsed into a
single category.

Labour rights have historically been framed as collective, human

rights as individual; labour rights are class-based; human rights claim to be universal
in their justification and application. Labour rights have generally been vindicated
through

economic and political action; human rights have been advanced through

cultural and social change and, more recently, through litigation. Labour has tended to
assert

its rights

at the level of the workplace and the nation state; human rights

movements in recent years have tended to be trans-national.

And a point of some

importance: labour rights have tended to be marginalized in the shaping of the new
global economic order, while human rights have been embraced by adherents of the
Washington consensus as both a precondition and consequence of global capitalism.
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Now one further complication: people in many countries, including the United Kingdom,
have come to regard trade unions as selfish and irresponsible and their political allies
— Labour and Social Democratic parties — as well past their sell-by date. Anyone
who harbours such a view of the political and industrial wings of the labour movement
is likely to balk at inscribing labour rights in the lexicon of human rights. And to make
matters even more difficult, such views are sometimes held by members of groups
that were historically excluded from labour markets or relegated to their margins, but
now invoke human rights laws to vindicate their rights against both employers and
unions.

At the very least, one might say, establishing the affinity of human rights and

labour rights is both a conceptual and a political challenge.

Nonetheless, the discourse of labour rights has swung sharply in the direction of human
rights. Why? For negative reasons and positive ones as well.

The negative reasons

are these: workers no longer identify themselves as producers but as consumers;
labour has therefore lost its raison d’etre as a class-based economic and political
movement. Moreover, changes in labour markets and modes of production have also
robbed it of much of its former economic power, while
national focus increasingly anachronistic.

As a

globalization has made its

consequence of these and other

developments, workers in most advanced democracies confront greater individual
insecurity and loss of collective agency than they have in decades. Hence the shift of
labour advocacy in the direction of human rights.

Aligning itself with the cause of

human rights will (it is hoped) broaden the base of the labour movement and rebuild its
alliance with other progressive forces; engaging with the discourse of human rights will
renew its intellectual energy and refresh its message; and adopting the legal and
constitutional strategies of its sister movement will

enable labour to secure solid

protections for workers comparable to those that human rights advocates have won for
all citizens over the past half-century.

What will this mean in practice? Human rights movements are deeply committed to
constitutionalism.

On the one hand, we have seen the adoption of a number of

impressive constitutional texts including conventions and charters on human rights
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adopted by the UN, the EU and other trans-national regimes, as well as the Canadian
Charter of 1982 and the UK Human Rights Act of 1998. On the other, there has been a
great surge of legislation, implementing these constitutional texts and a spectacular
outburst of litigation by citizens asserting and vindicating their rights.

If workers’

rights — to organize, to bargain, to strike, to receive a living wage, to enjoy decent
working conditions, to have a voice in workplace decisions, to be treated with respect —
if all of these

rights were reconceived

as human rights, they

too could be

constitutionalized; and they too would be robustly protected. That at least is the hope.
So in answer to the question “why am I here”: I am here to examine this turn in the
discourse of labour law.

II

THE RIGHTS-BASED
CONSTITUTIONALISM

LITIGATION-DRIVEN

JURIDICAL

MODEL

OF

To restate: the great ambition of labour rights advocates today is that workers’ rights
should also be constitutionalized: that they should be entrenched in the country’s basic
law; that no law should be able to derogate from them; and that they should be
justiciable: workers denied their rights should be able to secure legal redress. The
results would be transformative (these advocates argue); the costs would be minimal;
the world would be a better place.

This rights-based, litigation-driven juridical model of constitutionalism is not the only
one on offer; I will mention several alternatives shortly. However it is a model that
beguiles labour advocates, as it does many progressive thinkers and legal scholars
who believe in the transformative potential
constitution rights

will

of law.

They imagine that litigating

somehow succeed in balancing

capitalism’s

equation of

unequal power, ensure social justice and put material flesh on the dry, legal bones of
the liberal-democratic state. And now I have to admit, if you haven’t already guessed:
I am an advocate of labour rights; I am a progressive; and (I hope) I am a scholar: but I
am not beguiled.
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The rights-based, litigation-driven juridical model of constitutionalism is found in its
purest form in America, whose fundamental law guarantees freedom of association,
assembly,

expression and procedural due process.

These guarantees might, in

principle, have been interpreted as protecting the right of workers to join unions,
engage in industrial action, and be dismissed only on notice and for cause. But of
course they were not. The result — advocates of constitutionalization claim — is that
in America union membership in the private sector has fallen to about 8% — its lowest
level in 100 years; that strikes are an endangered species; and that workers are still
presumed to be employed “at will” and subject to dismissal without notice or recourse.
All of this is true, but does it follow that if labour’s rights under the constitution had been
acknowledged and protected, the lot of American workers would be better than it is?
Let’s look at some international comparisons. A number of European countries that
have entrenched labour rights in their constitutions. Workers in those countries seem
to enjoy higher living standards, greater job security and more influence over their
working lives than do American workers. But does this prove that constitutionalization
produces better outcomes for workers? Or merely that countries where there is
widespread political and social support for decent treatment of workers are more
likely than others to constitutionalize arrangements designed to produce those
outcomes?

This much, however, we do know: in few, if any, European countries is

U.S.-style rights-based constitutional litigation used to effect fundamental changes in
workers’ protections or in labour market policies.

Canada provides another instructive comparison. In a startling recent series of
decisions, Canadian appellate courts have held that under our Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, workers have the right to associate in unions, to call on their employers to
bargain in good faith with that union, to engage in industrial action to protect their
interests, and to be protected against legislative attempts to restrict those rights or to
override collectively bargained agreements. The courts have also ruled that the
industrial torts and the common law of wrongful dismissal must be reconfigured to
accord with Charter principles. Is this not proof-positive that constitutionalization of
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workers’ rights will revive labour’s flagging fortunes?
Time will tell, but my own prediction is that — the Charter notwithstanding — ten or
twenty years from now, Canadian union membership and power will have declined not
grown; that Canadian workers will enjoy lower, not higher, wages; that their jobs will
be more, not less, precarious; and that the social safety net that protects them against
the vicissitudes of the labour market will have fewer strands and more holes. If I’m
right, if the Charter fails to protect labour rights in the real world, I now add, it will be
true to form: all the available empirical evidence suggests that its potential to bring
about social transformation in other domains — including human rights — has been
greatly over-estimated.

How can this be? Rights-based constitutional litigation ought in principle to be the
most efficacious way to ensure that employment relations are fair in both a substantive
and procedural sense.

Alas, in practice litigation is unlikely to alter the deep structures of society and
economy that relegate workers to a subordinate role in their relations with employers.
There are many reasons why this is so:


because constitutions typically limit state — not private, corporate — power;



because labour rights are necessarily couched in general language that can
easily be read down;



because judges often comprehend labour rights less well and value them less
highly than those of other interest groups;



because litigation is expensive, slow and often inaccessible to individual
workers or their representatives;



because evidentiary and procedural rules generally make constitutional litigation
unsuitable for the resolution of open-ended conflicts of social interests;



because remedies that might fundamentally transform labour’s situation would
require a redistribution of wealth and power that courts lack the capacity to
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design, a mandate to initiate or the means to implement;


and because by pursuing their recourse within the existing constitutional
framework, workers would be implicitly agreeing to abstain from using their
economic and political power in ways that would radically alter that framework
— a Faustian bargain they might well come to regret.

III

ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF CONSTITUTIONALIZATION

However, as I mentioned earlier, the rights-based litigation-driven juridical model of a
constitution is not the only one available. Many states — in both the global North and
the global South — have dealt with labour rights in their constitutions, often in
language that is merely symbolic or evocative rather than tightly prescriptive. However,
some of these constitutions specify that legislation should be enacted to regulate
employment relations, that the state should strive to achieve just labour market
outcomes, or that employers and workers should collaborate in the management of
enterprises. But oddly, while these states have “constitutionalized” labour rights in
similar ways, they seem to end up adopting very different laws and policies,
constructing very different labour market institutions and achieving very different
degrees of industrial peace, social justice and national prosperity. In fact, one is
struck by the total disjuncture between the constitutional model adopted to protect
labour rights, on the one hand, and actual workplace and labour market outcomes on
the other. Rather, outcomes seem almost wholly attributable to other factors: national
demographies and endowments, national histories and cultures, and above all, the
forces of national and international political economy.

I want to say a word specifically about the United Kingdom which, as you know,
exemplifies a unique model of constitutionalism. Traditionally the British “constitution”
was understood merely as “that which constitutes” the polity. It comprises a
miscellany of charters and declarations, statutes and common law rules, invented
traditions and unwritten conventions that define the composition and functions of
Parliament, the judiciary, the executive and the Crown, as well as relations amongst
them and with citizens. Litigation was at best marginal to this constitutional model. In
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this sense, it was a political constitution, rather than a juridical one. Moreover, its
effects on labour rights were, at best, indirect. For example, the advent of a
universal electoral franchise facilitated the rise of the Labour Party and, after 1945, the
introduction of the welfare state and other labour market interventions.

However, things have changed somewhat. The British constitution is no longer strictly
a political constitution; it has become more of a rights-based juridical constitution, on
the American model. The Human Rights Act 1998 now gives juridical force to,
though it does not yet fully entrench, an array of human rights. However, since most
of the rights enumerated in the 1998 Act deal only peripherally with labour rights,
this shift has so far had little direct impact on workplace relations.

But the United Kingdom has not only a new juridical constitution bolted onto the side of
its old political constitution. It may also have acquired, almost unnoticed, an economic
constitution. The concept of an economic constitution enjoyed brief prominence in
Weimar Germany during the interwar period, and was advanced in this country by Otto
Kahn Freund, a former Weimar labour court judge and the leading British labour lawyer
of his time. The essence of the Weimar ideal was that workers and employers should
be constitutionally guaranteed a direct role in shaping labour law at every level from
the enterprise to the region to the sector to the national parliament, with a view to
creating an “autonomous” system of labour law.

Kahn Freund’s goal was much the

same, but his approach differed. He maintained that in the UK, it was not constitutional
guarantees but “the abstention of law”— what he called the principle of “collective
laissez faire” — that gave workers and employers a protected space within which to
establish wages and working conditions through collective bargaining. This principle
was “constitutional” in the sense that it constituted the fundamental premise of British
industrial relations.
But though quintessentially “British” — in the sense that it was unwritten, organic,
imprecise, and non-justiciable — Kahn Freund’s laissez faire version of the “economic
constitution” ultimately gave way to the dense regime of substantive and procedural law
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that now regulates British workplaces. Like the political constitution, the economic
constitution of the United Kingdom is today in part inspired and mandated by Europe;
but it is also driven by changes in British politics, society, law and economic life, and
by perceived or desired shifts in the balance of power in British labour markets. Alas,
after a half century of intense encounters with these more explicit forms of
constitutionalization, many British workers are worse off, in a relative sense, than
they were when Kahn Freund’s idea of an economic constitution was ascendant.

Alas

it isn’t sufficient that that labour rights are in some way “constitutionalized”: what
counts is the content of those rights, the institutions and processes through which they
are protected, and especially the political economy in which they are meant to be
realized.

Once again, I want to make brief mention of Canada. Our political and economic
constitutions do not mention “labour” specifically. However, in assigning jurisdiction
over labour matters to the provinces rather than to the federal government, the courts
relied on constitutional language that gave the provinces the right to legislate
concerning “matters of a merely local and private nature” and those involving “civil [that
is, contractual] rights”. This characterization of labour matters has had important
practical effects: it forestalled the emergence of national labour standards and labour
market institutions; it prevented the federal government from implementing
international labour standards without provincial consent; and it helped to dissolve the
national labour movement into a dozen relatively weak and sometimes warring
provincial movements.

But its greatest effects have been symbolic: if labour rights

involve “merely local” or “private” or contractual issues, how can they be regarded as
issues that fundamentally divide the polity, give rise to debates over the
maldistribution of wealth and power, or engage the soaring rhetoric of the Charter. In
other words, Canada’s political and economic constitutions contradict its juridical
constitution, the Charter.

This contradiction is unlikely to be resolved in favour of the Charter, especially in light of
what amounts to the entrenchment of neo-liberalism in Canada’s political and economic

9
constitutions. I have in mind Canada’s integration into a North American economic
space dominated by the United States; its commitment to monetarist policies
administered by an autonomous central bank; its fiscal practices that make the welfare
state unaffordable; and an array of legal and practical constraints that make unworkable
(not to say unthinkable) most forms of regulation, including the regulation of labour
markets.
Next, I want to say a word about the “constitution of the enterprise”. A good deal of
research and debate in recent years has focussed on how workers are integrated (or
not) into the governance of the enterprise. Here I’ll make special reference to North
American experience which admittedly lags far behind the experience of many
European countries which, in turn, lags far behind the ideal-type of worker participation
that is supposed to prevail in those countries.

In North America, we have seen four models of enterprise constitutions, four
experiments in enterprise governance that were all ostensibly designed to protect
workers’ interests:


the collective bargaining model which attempted to endow “citizens at work” with
formal rights of association, voice and due process analogous to those they
enjoy in the broader society;



the “stakeholder” model which mandated management decision-makers to
address the best interests not only of shareholders but also of workers,
customers, suppliers and others foreseeably affected by corporate action;



the “human capital” model whose rationale of enlightened self-interest was
meant to persuade employers to treat workers as valuable assets worthy of
investment in the form of good working conditions, benefits, amenities, training
and, especially, trust; and



the “worker capitalist” model which reminded workers that their pension and
other benefit funds made them significant members of the shareholding class,
with a stake in the success of predatory capitalism.
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As things turned out, all four of these North American experiments in
“constitutionalizing” labour’s role in workplace governance failed. They did so in part
because they sought to reform workplace governance without taking into account the
aggressive form of liberal market capitalism that prevails in North America, and in part
because they neither acknowledged nor addressed the internal political economy of
the enterprise itself.

The constitution of the enterprise, it turns out, cannot be reformed

in isolation from the juridical, political and economic constitutions of the state. Or in
another formulation: varieties of capitalism give rise to varieties of workplace
constitutions, not vice versa.

IV

CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE

Capitalism, however, operates not only within but across national borders. Deep
regional economic integration has been achieved in Europe; North America has gone
some way down that path; and regional trade regimes have begun to emerge in South
America, Asia and Africa. The question is: will it be possible to entrench labour rights
in whatever passes for the constitutions of these regional regimes?

Based on the European experience, one should not be too optimistic. Even the EU,
which leads the world in this respect, has been oddly diffident about entrenching
collective labour rights in its “constitution”. NAFTA has been even more diffident,
though it has adopted a so-called side-agreement, the North American Accord on
Labour Cooperation, whose protection for labour rights can most charitably be
described as “minimalist”. And so far as I know, none of the other regional trade
regimes has come close to entrenching labour rights, except in a nominal sense.

It is

hardly surprising, then, that the WTO with its global, rather than regional, mandate
has resolutely resisted making compliance with labour rights a condition of doing
business in the world economy.
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What about the International Labour Organization? Almost 200 conventions have been
promulgated by the ILO; states that adopt these conventions are obliged, under the ILO
charter, to implement them. In addition, the ILO has identified a core of labour rights
whose implementation is required of states even without adoption, simply by virtue of
their membership in that organization.

And finally, ILO conventions have clearly

influenced national laws and constitutions by osmosis as well as by explicit adoption.
But does all of this confer quasi-constitutional status on the labour rights articulated by
the ILO?

Based on the behaviour of many ILO member states, including some advanced
democracies, one would have to say not

However at the same time one must

acknowledge the severe practical problems of entrenching labour rights in global
workplaces.

These workplaces often form part of a transnational value chain linking corporations
based in the advanced economies with widely-dispersed partner firms, subsidiaries and
arm’s-length suppliers. It is therefore often difficult for workers to identify their ultimate
employer.

Second, given that operations can be moved relatively freely to different

sites along the value chain, or off-loaded entirely, employers are easily able to escape
both legal constraints imposed by national governments and pressures generated by
unions or social movements. Third, “constitutionalization” implies that workers will
have the right to participate in the development of norms governing their own terms
and conditions of employment. However, their ability to do so is radically constrained
because they are located in different countries, speak different languages, are regulated
by different laws, have different (or no) traditions of concerted action, experience
different material circumstances and social environments and may not even realize
that they share a common employer.

These are all formidable barriers to constitutionalizing employment relations in global
enterprises. And let me add one more: the workers most in need of protection are
often located in the countries of the global south, where labour standards are likely to
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be lower than in the global north. However, attempts to project labour standards from
north to south are almost certain to be regarded as a threat to the comparative
advantage of developing countries, if not outright neo-colonialism.

So: the constitutionalization of labour rights in the global context is almost unthinkable.
And yet, despite the absence of a global constitution, of global labour legislation, of a
global labour inspectorate or a global labour movement, there is some evidence that
labour rights are taking hold in places where they never existed before. Under attack
from unions, social movements and political opponents, governments of the home
countries of global corporations try to persuade or pressure those corporations to
behave decently when they operate abroad. To some extent as well, acceptable
labour standards become imbricated in corporate policies, practices and routines of
work that are disseminated outward from the head office to all the elements of the
global enterprise. And finally, to some extent ideas about labour rights — like ideas
about sport, style and sex — just percolate across borders, at both the grassroots and
the elite level; through the media and by word of mouth; and with both positive and
negative consequences.
I mention these promising developments — in today’s vernacular, “green shoots” — in
order to suggest that perhaps constitutions are sometimes created from the bottom up
rather than the top down, that they may result from an accidental concatenation of
unrelated events rather that from the deliberations of august assemblies, that they may
be shaped by practical struggles in particular domains rather than by the
comprehensive designs of legal architects.

V

CONCLUSION

I have framed this last observation as a commentary on the constitutionalization of
labour rights in the global economy.

But now, in conclusion, I will suggest that it

applies as well to domestic constitutions. I return to my earlier juxtaposition of formal
juridical constitutions and political, economic and enterprise constitutions.
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Clearly states can adopt juridical constitutions; they can entrench labour rights; they
can make those rights justiciable; they can authorize citizens to sue to defend their
rights; and they can authorize the courts to award them remedies. In fact, this sort of
constitutionalization proceeds at a manic pace: since 1789 national constitutions
have had a median life span of 17 years, and an average life span of less than half
that.

But what does this sort of constitutionalization signify?

Do we really imagine

that each new constitution brings fundamental change to the state that adopts it? that
rights made justiciable thereby become effective in the real world? that citizens and
workers) endowed with those rights will actually be empowered? that courts that
acquire remedial powers can and will attempt to use them to realign the deep
structures of economy and polity? and that if they do so, they will succeed in
transforming global capitalism and making the world safer for workers?

I have asked what appear to be four distinct questions, but are all really variations on a
single theme: scepticism about rights-based, litigation-driven juridical models of
constitutionalism. I conclude by offering in place of scepticism four hypotheses that
are, in my view, entirely plausible:


the constitution that counts is the “real” constitution that expresses, normalizes,
legitimates and therefore reinforces actual-existing relations of power;



in the event of conflict, the “real” constitution will prevail over juridical
constitutions;



strategies designed to produce significant change though constitutional
litigation will prove to be disappointing for labour advocates and, in the long
run, for human rights advocates as well; and



workers with an inclination and capacity for collective action will find a way to
vindicate their “rights” whatever the juridical constitution might say or however
the courts might rule.

I hypothesize, therefore I am.

